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Seven Theses on Human Rights: (1) The Idea of Humanity

human right dissertation topics

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Example papers and sample papers on the most popular topics. Thursday, October 21, Dissertation on Human Rights. Dissertation on Human Rights Having a right means that others have an obligation to respect that right.

It is a privilege that is attained by being exactly what the right pertains to or whom the right is offered to. Therefore, human rights , refers to rights of anyone who fits under the category of humans.

To begin with, rights are not a written code or law, however the laws itself is directly influenced by the rights of certain persons, the law does not directly influence human rights, in terms of existence of new rights. Human rights have a correlation with human nature and with human nature being similar throughout cultures, similar human rights reigns same throughout most countries and can be thought of as absolute, rather than relative. This case nonetheless highlights, yet again, the failure of both the common law of England and statute to protect in an effective way the personal privacy of individual citizens.

J uses the settled position in Germany to contrast the tortured reasoning that the British courts have had to apply to invasions of privacy for generations. The confusion of the court in Kaye is a good example of when overlap occurs between the various actions that UK law has developed to deal with issues of privacy. The plaintiff in Kaye argued four separate ways: Libel, malicious falsehood, trespass to the person and passing off.

This can be contrasted against the position in France where strong privacy laws enshrined in the constitution inhibit free speech and allowed Francois Mitterand to conceal his illegitimate daughter until she reached the age of 19 [4].

On the flipside of privacy, Britain has a very self congratulatory proud tradition of extolling the merits of free speech and the freedom of the press, a freedom, as Robertson forcefully argues, which was, prior to the Human Rights Act, a hollow concept that any government could detract from at whim [5].

As a corollary, privacy could be protected indirectly through the development of laws such as trespass and official secrets while freedom of speech could be eroded indiscriminately to bolster a state that was seeking to protect its own interests. Robertson observes on this paradox:. It is crucial to note that s. Or are they able to report fearlessly in the knowledge that article 10 will reinforce their position?

In short the Human Rights Act and articles 8 and 10 did not step into a vacuum and must be analysed accordingly though it is debatable to what extent freedom of expression was protected in the UK prior to The tortured history of privacy and free speech in the UK in chapter 1 will be analysed before examining both of the fundamental rights at stake in chapter 2. Chapter 3 will address the law of libel in the UK and secondary case research will be conducted into libel cases involving newspapers and the mediafrom to This chapter will also provide an exhaustive look at the latest case law in relation to libel including the cases of Mr.

Justice Eady up to his very latest in [17] as well as case studies of important libel cases including the seminal Max Mosley and the News of the World trial [18] which was Mr. This chapter will conclude by determining whether the claim by Paul Dacre of the Daily Mail, that Mr. Justice Eady is responsible for eroding free speech, is true [19].

Chapter 4 looks at the position in France in order to extract any useful lessons for privacy reform in the UK while chapter 5 draws all the strands of this study together to assess the impact of the Human Rights Act, in the shape of articles 8 and 10, on privacy and free speech in the UK. Finally chapter 6 will provide recommendations for the future based on conclusions drawn from the previous five chapters.

With the historic multitude of laws enhancing privacy the role of the human rights act in promoting freedom of speech is remarkably important and Robertson makes an inspired case for article This covenant — which enters British law by way of the incorporation of Article 10 of the ECHR — reflects the core belief of the eighteenth century republican revolutions in France and America, adopted as an article of faith in modern Human Rights instruments, that freedom of speech is a good in itself, an essential pillar of democratic order.

This study will focus on the press as their struggle for free speech is a front in the battle for freedom of expression: Thus there is no better prism through which to evaluate the impact of articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR as private individuals do not have the vast resources, since legal aid is not available, to initiate libel claims or contend with the costs of victory or defeat [23].

Privacy in the United Kingdom has never enjoyed the protection of statute and has remained an enigma that is referred to by convention rather than constitution [24].

Yet it is a fallacy to say that there have been no laws that have addressed privacy to a degree. In terms of civil law: The suite of laws, both criminal and civil, which enhance privacy often overlap and can influence the press although often indirectly as the anchor for a Convention Rights argument [39] which the court as a public authority under the Human Rights Act must act compatibly with [40].

The most relevant action for privacy matters in relation to the media is breach of confidence which many commentators have defined as a virtual right to privacy in all but name [41].

This equitable doctrine developed out of the case of Prince Albert v Strange [42] where the Prince had supplied various members of his family with private drawings. An employee of the prince disseminated a copy of the etchings entrusted to him to a friend.

This case is very much in keeping with the use of breach of confidence in the early half of the 20 th century as a restraint on the disclosure of trade secrets [44]. Prince Albert was followed by the two cases in the s that sought to clarify and define the law of breach of confidence. In Argyll v Argyll [45] confidential secrets of marriage were successfully restrained and set the benchmark for the kind of information that can be restrained even absent of a contract or a property rights violation.

The classic test of breach of confidence came two years later in Coco v A N Clark Engineers Ltd [46] which produced the classic test, in the words of Mackenzie [47] , to establish a breach of confidence: This test has been gradually eroded and stripped away over the years to reveal what Mackenzie argues is a virtual right to privacy [49]. The obligation of confidence has, in particular, been relaxed from the strong bonds that were required, such as marriage [50] , to mere friendship [51] sufficing to satisfy this limb of the test.

In the classic case on breach of confidence arrived in the form of Attorney General v Jonathan Cape [52] which demonstrated the scope for breach of confidence to be widened to material published by the media which is in the public interest.

Lord Widgery made the following observations:. Five years later Laws J felt confident enough, albeit obiter dicta , to again reassert that breach of confidence was effectively a right to privacy in all but name and this was perceived to be the first signs of an emergence of breach of confidence as a right to privacy [57] two years before the Human Rights Act in came into force.

The most important case on breach of confidence so far has been Douglas v Hello! Ltd [58] which was an appeal against the decision to grant an interim injunction preventing Hello! The action was brought under breach of confidence coupled with a breach of privacy under Article 8 of ECHR. The law no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: It should be pointed that Bridge L.

Eadie J outlines the modern position:. The law now affords protection to information in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, even in circumstances where there is no pre-existing relationship giving rise of itself to an enforceable duty of confidence.

The complementary laws outlined above such as trespass and breach of copyright all serve to augment the pivotal role of breach of confidence. The Human Rights Act did not step into a vacuum but was absorbed into existing actions such as breach of confidence: There is a historical common law right to freedom of expression in the UK which Laws J described as being: Lord Bingham of Cornhill, an eloquent defender of free speech, produced this classic observation:.

But there can be no government by the people if they are ignorant of the issues to be resolved, the arguments for and against different solutions and the facts underlying those arguments…Where abuses are exposed, they can be remedied.

Even where abuses have already been remedied, the public may be entitled to know that they occurred. The role of the press in exposing abuses and miscarriages of justice has been a potent and honourable one…Despite the high value placed by the common law on freedom of expression, it was not until incorporation of the European Convention into our domestic law by the Human Rights Act that this fundamental right was underpinned by statute.

Thus like privacy, freedom of expression was recognised if not eulogised long before the Human Rights Act arrived. There are myriad ways to hedge in what is left of free speech and the debate against the press enjoying untrammelled expression took on a life of its own in the 90s. Throughout all of the times of crisis under both the Thatcher and Major governments the press only survived by clinging to the last vestiges of self-regulation: The Commission was memorably attacked as concerned only in looking after its own: It has been observed that it now has a role to play in court cases involving the press and article Thus the Human Rights Act could justifiably be argued to have given some indirect teeth to the Code of Conduct, although not the PCC itself which continues to be seen as toothless [83] , but the important point remains that which Lord Bingham made in Shayler ; that although freedom of expression existed before the Human Rights Act it is only through human rights that it has been given a renewed emphasis albeit stopping dramatically short of a presumptive priority [84].

As will be seen in the following chapter on the European jurisprudence, there is a balancing exercise to be carried out between article 8 and article 10 which underpins the modern approach [85]. Robertson points out that freedom of speech is too easily trampled on by the various laws that the courts have developed and highlights James v Commonwealth of Australia [87] as being reflective of the courts historical interpretation of a qualified right of free speech prior to the Human Rights Act.

A free press has often been at the heart of arguments for free speech and the two have often been confused as, understandably, most cases on freedom of expression involve the press in some capacity and the two notions are inextricably woven [90]. The House of Lords has very recently reaffirmed the Reynolds public interest defence for journalists [93] and the protection of freedom of expression for newspapers, and by extension all of us, is gathering pace despite some worrying inroads into privacy.

As has been pointed out above there is a duty for the courts to act compatibly with Convention rights being as they are included under the list of public bodies under the Human Rights Act The extension of Convention rights to private law cases was described by the court in Venables v News Group Newspapers [95] as being beyond doubt and that s. The content of the privacy right in article 8 is very broad and has been held to cover: In reality this means private life in physical and psychological integrity [98] and even includesthe right to choose death [99] despite the memorable submissions of the Secretary of State in Pretty: The courts, in respect of article 8 and the media, have adopted a two stage test for article 8 which firstly asks whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and if there is to balance this against a countervailing public interest in interfering with the article 8 rights [].

On the first limb of the test, which is objective [] , it needs to be established whether the activity reported on is in the public or private domains and there are several factors to be taken into account such as absence of consent and the nature of the intrusion. In Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd [] the blogging of the detective was clearly a public activity while by contrast in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [] the claimant did have such an expectation given the private nature of the sexual encounters.

Regarding the second limb of the test the public interest, if the first limb is engaged, must be sufficient to outweigh the interference with the article 8 rights of the claimant. Again when looking at Author of a Blog the public interest is apparent in unmasking a senior police officer as the mysterious writer of a blog which had criticised the police while in Murray v Express Newspapers [] the public interest element was very weak in taking pictures of the children of a celebrity and the fact that an ordinary, reasonable person would consider the publication of the pictures abhorrent was significant.

The public interest has an explanatory definition in the PCC Editorial Code which has, in light of s. Eady J asked a simple question to demonstrate the concept:. There must be some limits and, even in more serious cases, any such intrusion should be no more than is proportionate. The content of the right to freedom of expression is also very broad and includes not only written and oral forms of communication but also videos and internet sites [].

The next stage in the analysis is whether there has been an interference with article 10? This is also easily proved and it has been held that injunctions [] , convictions under the Official Secrets Act [] and more gravely state censorship [] all constitute an interference with article As Merris points out the situation is not always so clear cut: The real hurdle in article 10 is under 2: There are two aspects of necessity which then need to be analysed: On the both it has been observed that:.

In determining proportionality the case law has developed certain general principles which the court will pay heed to: This case marked a watershed moment in striking the correct balance between article 8 and article 10 when Princess Caroline von hannover attempted to defend her right to privacy against paparazzi and tabloid intrusions. The present case did not concern the dissemination of ideas but of images containing very personal or even intimate information about an individual.

Furthermore photographs appearing in the tabloid press were often taken in a climate of continual harassment which induced in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or even of persecution. The court then went on to hold that in the absence of any legitimate public concern freedom of expression would be more narrowly construed [].

The newspaper then disclosed details of her addiction and obtained photos of her therapy meetings. The claimant succeeded at first instance but then the Court of Appeal overturned the decision in favour of the newspaper, ruling that publication of the photos was in the public interest. There was then an appeal to the House of Lords where their lordships by a decision upheld her right to privacy.

Lord Hoffman dissenting made the following observation on the unique difficulties of this case:. It was these falsehoods which, as was conceded, made it justifiable, for a newspaper to report the fact that she was addicted. Hoffman went on to point out that the House, although divided on the law, was united on the principles to be taken from the case.

Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary.

Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test.

This is how I will approach the present case. The libel laws of the UK are so attractive to international litigants that a tourism industry has grown up around it which Parliament has now sought legislation to address [].

But why are British libel laws so attractive to foreign companies and individuals? Bearing in mind that Carter Ruck even threatened to gag Parliament it becomes clear that the libel laws in this country may be out of control [] and that the Draft Defamation Bill is recognition of this.

The historical development of libel is traced by Geoffrey Robertson who asserts that the current form of libel can be traced from the Victorian Club: Thus a system emerges which attempts to strike a balance between the right of free speech and the right of reputation with the balance leaning heavily towards the latter.

From these humble beginnings the modern test of libel can be easily elicited from the dictum of Lord Atkin: Libel, as distinct from slander, is actionable without damage [] and is one of the few surviving civil torts which, under the Supreme Court Act [] , still has a presumption in favour of a jury should one of the parties request it [] although this presumption will be abolished should the Draft Defamation Bill receive royal assent [].

The issues are often complex and jury trial simply invites expensive interlocutory battles, such as the one before this court, which attempt to pre-empt issues from going before the jury. The consultation criticised the costs, simplification of complex legal concepts and the effect on settlements jury trials have in defamation cases []. Furthermore damage would have to be proved under the new draft Bill which would be an astounding departure from the past where up until now there has been a presumption that such defamatory words cause harm without the need for proof [].

Subject to the claimant being identified as the object of the allegedly defamatory statement [] and not being part of a group whose collective reputation cannot be protected [] anyone who has been involved in the publication, from the author down to the distributor or even an Internet Service Provider [] , may be sued in libel.

The Defamation Act put some of the law of libel on a statutory footing and enabled distributors who were unaware of the defamatory material to escape liability by the defence of innocent dissemination []. Two final but crucial points remain to be made: The defence only applies to comment and not to fact and is a distinction which led Eady J to err [].

If the defendant proves that the statement is true then there can be no action. The defendant need not show that the statement was in the public interest and it cannot be undone by the claimant proving malice []. Under the Defamation Act the defence do not have to prove the truth of each allegation [].

Qualified privilege, which can be defeated if malice is shown, attaches to all of the circumstances in schedule 1 of the Act which includes fair and accurate reports of legislatures or international organisations anywhere in the world []. If the offer is accepted then the claimant can no longer bring an action of defamation [] but if the offer is refused then this will form a statutory defence at the trial []. This defence arose out of a case in the House of Lords [] where their Lordships extended the defence of qualified privilege to protect the publication of material which the reporter was under a moral or social duty to publish and, as a corollary; the recipients have an interest in receiving.

The House of Lords held in Reynolds that the Sunday Times could not benefit from the defence as they had acted unfairly in omitting the explanation of Albert Reynold, the ex-premier of Ireland, from their Irish edition after his resignation in []. This defence is most relevant to the aims of this study as it strikes a balance between the protection of reputation and the freedom of expression as Lord Nicholls explains:. The context is newspaper discussion of a matter of political importance.

Liability arises only if the writer knew the statement was not true or if he made the statement recklessly, not caring whether it was true or false, or if he was actuated by personal spite or some other improper motive. There have been a lot of problems with this defence, however, and these ten factors were considered to potentially be ten obstacles by the House of Lords [] with Lord Hoffman taking the unusual step in this case of criticising Eady J, at first instance, for his interpretation of the Reynolds privilege:.

That is how Eady J treated them. Commentators have also remarked on the judicial hostility to Reynolds and the uncertainty it created []. In the case of Jameel Lord Hoffman took the opportunity to highlight the importance of responsible journalism, a concept which Eady J had described as subjective but which Lord Hoffman defined as an objective standard all could relate to. The developments in Jameel were vital in resuscitating a defence which had been reeling in the wrong hands:.

As pointed out above, malice can defeat the defences of fair comment in the public interest and qualified privilege as described by Lord Diplock: If this be proved, then even positive belief in the truth of what is published will not enable the defamer to avail himself of the protection of the privilege to which he would have otherwise been entitled. As noted above, it has been recognised judicially that the press have a unique watchdog role in society which legitimises a democracy and embodies a central pillar of freedom of expression in a democracy [].

The seminal studies of Barendt et al were conducted in and research carried out for this dissertation revealed that there has not been its equal in the post human rights libel environment: Taking into account accusations from the press of the judiciary creating a right to privacy via the back door crystallising in [] and the case against Dr. Singh brought by the British Chiropractic Association provoking widespread criticism in May [] it is apt to examine case law in the period from January [] up until January [].

A further reason for choosing this period is that Mr. Justice Tugendhat in a move which some commentators cautiously welcomed as being a positive one for freedom of expression []. The results are presented in graphical form and the following will be analysed: Justice Eady [] , the defences employed and success of interim injunctions as will be the anchoring action to which the Convention Rights are parasitic. Before embarking upon this research it is wise to recount the findings of Barendt et al:.

The media may, for instance, be unsure whether they could prove the truth of the allegations in court or…they may be concerned by the cost of defending an action bought by a wealthy and persistent litigant. Within the specified period 35 [] libel cases against newspapers reached conclusion. Below is a graph of the cases split into the identity of the defendant along with the result for the defendant.

These seven main players in the newspaper industry account for 30 of the cases with a further five including various other newspapers as the defendants []. Express newspapers include the Daily and Sunday Express [].

Finally the last two are self-explanatory: In order to properly establish whether Convention arguments are really influencing libel laws in the UK with respect to newspapers the graph below is a breakdown of cases within the period which have been determined by convention arguments:. With a statement to open court being protected by privilege [] however, it is exceptionally difficult to divine arguments on Convention rights.

As a proportion of the overall cases these numbers are very low, 6 in a total of 35, but the effects of these decisions are more profound and more far-reaching than otherwise []. In these cases freedom of expression under article 10 is clearly being favoured in a minority of cases isolated to their facts while the decisions of Mosley and Murray , taken together, have provoked furious criticism that article 8 is being extended in scope [].

In the period examined, from January — March , it is clear to see just how much the European Convention on Human Rights, and in particular articles 10 and 8, have permeated the fabric of UK libel law.

From a free speech perspective in the UK domestic courts it is clear that the right to privacy is favouring individuals and both Mosley and Murray are incontestable evidence for a broadening of the scope of article 8 potentially into the public sphere for all [].

The two domestic case s which favoured article 10 over article 8 are tied closely to their facts and it is submitted that their scope is limited: Regarding the European Court of Human Rights the message is mixed: The domestic courts are clearly favouring privacy and crucially so too is the jurisprudence from Strasbourg:.

Far from being an unsanctioned judicial crusade against the press as Mr Dacre might have us believe , English judges have simply been developing English privacy law in step with the Strasbourg court, as, of course, they are bound to do under the HRA. I will christen this shadowing of European jurisprudence, enshrined in s. He had erred, in the opinion of Lord Judge in Singh , in two respects: These bold proclamations did not stop France developing a law of privacy which, as Delany and Murphy point out, is traditionally seen as being at the opposite end of the spectrum from the UK which has no precise tort of privacy [].

There is a certain sphere of protection for individuals which the law keeps sacrosanct [] and the image of the individual is considered to be their own [] and even an extension of property [].

Trouille interestingly points out that Bill Clinton might well have been saved from the Kenneth Starr treatment had America a similar system of protecting privacy. Where the offences referred to by the present article were performed in the sight and with the knowledge of the persons concerned without their objection, although they were in a position to do so, their consent is presumed. The inquisitorial procedure of France applies these laws strictly although as Troille observes there a certain element of discretion in the search for the truth [].

The press are indeed mentioned throughout the criminal civil code in relation to a number of offences with the qualification that the law will punish only those responsible: On top of all these laws is the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights articles 8 and 10 upon ratification of the Convention in [] which, much unlike the UK courts their sudden conversion to adopting the balancing approach, have undergone a slow dance of death in which the right to privacy has been gradually eroded until in the Cour de Cassation found, in a case involving the publication of an image without consent, that the strict application of the image right and the absolutist approach were no longer appropriate in the 21 st century where freedom of expression is recognised and the watchdog role of the press in a democracy is beyond dispute:.

It has been commented that Britain and France, traditionally so alienated towards each other regarding privacy, are currently evolving towards a common set of principles under the shadow of the ECHR []. In France, as noted above, the absolutist approach has been incrementally eroded to reveal a judiciary which has started to use language similar to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

In a famous case [] brought by the current president of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, article 9 was invoked in alleging that the newspaper le matin had breached his privacy in publishing a whole series of reports of his apparent marital problems. Incredibly the court at first instance found there was no breach of privacy as there was a legitimate interest in the stories for the people of France.

Some of the articles did breach the privacy laws but the difficult question the court faced was how to reconcile the absolutist privacy laws with a President who had clearly put himself in the public eye [].

The judge in this case acknowledged the influence of Strasbourg jurisprudence on the decision:. The balancing requirement has been transposed into UK law [] who, in a miracle of adoption given that the Human Rights Act only came into force 13 years ago, now conduct the very exercise that France is starting to embrace in 30 years after they ratified the Convention.

The omission of article 8 from the French cases on ECHR applicable law is striking however and it has been noted that they have not sought to distinguish it from Article 9 of the Civil Code although in truth the differences between the two are marginal. Delany and Murphy argue that it is in the concept of public interest where the UK and France differ markedly, with France being more closely aligned to Strasbourg than the UK: They further comment that while the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy is used as a threshold test in the UK with caveats including what the person was actually doing etc it is used more expansively in Strasbourg.

Whether Franceand the UKare evolving towards a point of common principle may depend upon the extent to which France, like the UKhas done in a continental drift towards privacy [] , will allow itself to be swept up in the full implications of von hannover []. The question is, to what extent? By section 6 of the Act UK courts are, as we have seen, obliged to take into account Convention Rights as public bodies and furthermore obliged to take into account the jurisprudence of Strasbourg under section 2 whenever a question of Convention Rights arises in a UK court.

This permeation of the courts by these articles has reinvigorated the right to privacy, unwritten and supplemented by a grotesque menagerie of laws both civil and criminal [] , and the right to freedom of expression, held up by centuries of rhetoric but little substance [] , although to varying and dramatic effects. With respect to libel law and the media the secondary case research conducted in chapter 3 revealed that there is a continental drift towards privacy [] which, if left unchecked, will rein in what advances of freedom of expression [] the courts have enabled in the 13 years since The cases looked at in — which advanced freedom of expression were confined to their facts [] and, with respect, limited in their outlook while the cases on privacy and most notably Murray , could potentially broaden the scope of privacy to all individuals in public life even if taking an innocuous walk down the street.

There is undoubtedly confusion over the application of these Convention rights which does not help when assessing their impact as the fracture between Campbell and von hannover demonstrates []. Bearing in mind that the law of breach of confidence has evolved into a right of privacy in all but name [] then it is clear that the impact of articles 10 and 8 can only be analysed with this in mind.

It is the contention of this study that the impact of the two rights has been imbalanced: Both of these aspects have been challenged in Strasbourg and both have been dismissed [] even under the shadow of the Human Rights Act. The influence of Justice Eady has been a factor in moving the goalposts towards privacy, most notably in Singh , but although he has not been applying law like a legal positivist, neither can it truly be said that he has been imposing his own moral judgements upon cases: The British law of libel is a powerful restraint on the press and still exerts a chilling grip in This is really another side of article 6 and the equality of arms debate, inspired by Mcdonalds suing two environmentalists in the s [].

Max Mosley, emboldened by his triumph over the News of the World, has lodged a petition with the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg to challenge UK law regarding the lodging of interim injunctions. The proposed system would allow the individual at the heart of the story a grace period in which to reflect upon whether an interim injunction should be sought and if the story is deemed not to be permissible then publication should be restrained until trial [].

But would this justify a system which militates against the rule against prior restrain in UK law []? The Mosley case is certainly extreme but does not justify such a curtailment in freedom of expression and surely such a system would be immediately upon to a counterattack based upon article 10? The Supreme Court of America has said:.

The only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defence and international affairs may be an enlightened citizenry — informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government.

All of the recommendations contained in the Draft Defamation Bill are welcome and no single clause should be dropped during the consultation. Of particular importance is the requirement to demonstrate harm which single-handedly dispatches of a rule which produced a ridiculous distinction between slander and libel where only the latter, where the statement complained of is in writing or in some permanent form, could sue even though they have suffered no financial loss while the former would have to be proved in monetary terms [].

The extension of this to libel will prevent many needless actions and free up the courts. The Press Complaints Commission is widely recognised to be without teeth [] in enforcing disputes against newspapers and self-regulation, although the better option than a law of privacy, needs to be reformed in light of it receiving several thousand complaints per year but only adjudicating on a select number [] and even then only able to request corrections with no question of costs, expenses or compensation.

The PCC is still seen as being in bed with the very journalists it purports, weakly, to hold to account. Are we no longer able to intervene in history? Any ethics is always manipulable. Is the problem, then, that any isolation of such a concept will inevitably deliver the same result, namely, a necessarily contingent history, which is then presented as a priori and unalterable? I might even stray so far as to argue that injustice is not, as this analysis suggests, the opposite of justice, but rather its constant product.

Wondering if they are humans, he orders one of his officials to try and hit them to see if they bleed and are humans. See Book 6 of the Odyssey for example: Brilliant, and probative, point about Plato. After all, a woman can in theory become a philosopher ruler. I was thinking about the slave in Meno the other day. So many have argued that Plato lacks any real notion of a participatory dialectic, i.

That criticism will later come back to haunt figures as different as Aquinas, Hegel, and, I think, at least some of Marx.

The way the dialogues are written seems to undermine the seemingly protreptic nature of the speeches. What do you make of the Euthydemus? Or the horribly unreliable narrator of the Symposium? The split was between mortals and gods or man and beast. Even the Phaeacians, who are totally cut off from other people and compared to the Cyclops and Giants, are considered part of humanity. Another related question is: How accepted were their ideas? Many 5th century Athenians certainly become chauvinist after the Persian wars.

But with important dissenters. Plato, and probably Socrates, pokes fun at Athenian supremicism. They ironise it and parody it. PS — I certainly agree that Plato and Aristotle do not play the role in Athens that they would later play in the Middle Ages, either in influence or in substance. The staunch democratic faction of Anytus and Meletus would have fallen dumbstruck reading Augustine and Aquinas! Your email address will not be published. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

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25 Inspiring Ideas For A Dissertation On Human Rights

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Aug 31,  · Example human rights dissertation topic 9: Suggested initial topic reading: Combining aspects of human rights, welfare reform and public policy, this dissertation reviews proposals put forward by Britain's Coalition government to make prisoners work whilst they are in custody.

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25 Inspiring Ideas For A Dissertation On Human Rights. If you are looking for inspiring ideas for your dissertation on human rights, this is the right place to take a look. In the following lines, we recommend you 25 useful headings which may be suitable for this task. The importance of having all the countries comply with human rights.

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Human rights are the exclusive laws given to human beings as being the independent entities of the society. These rights are not laws but they govern the laws of any nation. Hence the human rights dissertation different aspects of these rights. Aug 30,  · This dissertation topic will explore the evolution of European Court of Human Rights' case law on the right of a private life and family life for failed asylum seekers (Boultif v Switzerland [] ECHR /00; Uner v Netherlands [] ECHR 10/99).

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Dissertation Topics- Human Rights- Organizations Employees Topics for Dissertation on Human Rights of Employees in an Organization Some more topics to the students are provided as free dissertation topic help from Students Assignment Help/5(K). Database of example human rights dissertations - these dissertations were produced by students to aid you with your studies.