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What is a summary of Federalist 10?

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❶By this token, Madison suggests that political parties are dangerous because they can work against the public, but he sees no way to halt them from forming.

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Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay
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Madison believed that factions are unavoidable because men, by nature, seek out other men who hold similar opinions and desires. However, he feared factions that held negative ideals and worked against the best interests of society. One of the most popular contemporary interpretations of Paper 10 takes the advice on factions to extend to political parties in general.

By this token, Madison suggests that political parties are dangerous because they can work against the public, but he sees no way to halt them from forming. Instead, he suggests a representative republic form of government where men vote for representatives who vote for laws. Choosing that form instead of a direct, true democracy ensures that the factions that gain power will not have the ability to harm the rights of others.

The paper itself suggests that the government must either limit the forming of factions or control their effects. He says that the only ways to prevent the forming of factions are to eliminate liberty or to create a homogenous society, and since both are impossible, the government must choose to control the effects of the factions.

In summary, Madison wrote Federalist Paper 10 to argue that a representative republic system will prevent factions from attaining too much power and going against the best interests of the public. What is a summary of Federalist 10? The second option, creating a society homogeneous in opinions and interests, is impracticable.

The diversity of the people's ability is what makes them succeed more or less, and inequality of property is a right that the government should protect. Madison particularly emphasizes that economic stratification prevents everyone from sharing the same opinion. Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects.

He then argues that the only problem comes from majority factions because the principle of popular sovereignty should prevent minority factions from gaining power. Madison offers two ways to check majority factions: Madison states, "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man", [19] so the cure is to control their effects.

He makes an argument on how this is not possible in a pure democracy but possible in a republic. With pure democracy, he means a system in which every citizen votes directly for laws, and, with republic, he intends a society in which citizens elect a small body of representatives who then vote for laws.

He indicates that the voice of the people pronounced by a body of representatives is more conformable to the interest of the community, since, again, common people's decisions are affected by their self-interest. He then makes an argument in favor of a large republic against a small republic for the choice of "fit characters" [20] to represent the public's voice. In a large republic, where the number of voters and candidates is greater, the probability to elect competent representatives is broader.

The voters have a wider option. In a small republic, it would also be easier for the candidates to fool the voters but more difficult in a large one. The last argument Madison makes in favor of a large republic is that as, in a small republic, there will be a lower variety of interests and parties, a majority will more frequently be found. The number of participants of that majority will be lower, and, since they live in a more limited territory, it would be easier for them to agree and work together for the accomplishment of their ideas.

While in a large republic the variety of interests will be greater so to make it harder to find a majority. Even if there is a majority, it would be harder for them to work together because of the large number of people and the fact they are spread out in a wider territory. A republic, Madison writes, is different from a democracy because its government is placed in the hands of delegates, and, as a result of this, it can be extended over a larger area.

The idea is that, in a large republic, there will be more "fit characters" to choose from for each delegate. Also, the fact that each representative is chosen from a larger constituency should make the "vicious arts" of electioneering [21] a reference to rhetoric less effective. For instance, in a large republic, a corrupt delegate would need to bribe many more people in order to win an election than in a small republic. Also, in a republic, the delegates both filter and refine the many demands of the people so as to prevent the type of frivolous claims that impede purely democratic governments.

Though Madison argued for a large and diverse republic, the writers of the Federalist Papers recognized the need for a balance. They wanted a republic diverse enough to prevent faction but with enough commonality to maintain cohesion among the states.

He notes that if constituencies are too large, the representatives will be "too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests". No matter how large the constituencies of federal representatives, local matters will be looked after by state and local officials with naturally smaller constituencies. The Anti-Federalists vigorously contested the notion that a republic of diverse interests could survive.

The author Cato another pseudonym, most likely that of George Clinton [24] summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no. Whoever seriously considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits of the United States, with the variety of its climates, productions, and commerce, the difference of extent, and number of inhabitants in all; the dissimilitude of interest, morals, and policies, in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a consolidated republican form of government therein, can never form a perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity, for to these objects it must be directed: Generally, it was their position that republics about the size of the individual states could survive, but that a republic on the size of the Union would fail.

A particular point in support of this was that most of the states were focused on one industry—to generalize, commerce and shipping in the northern states and plantation farming in the southern. The Anti-Federalist belief that the wide disparity in the economic interests of the various states would lead to controversy was perhaps realized in the American Civil War , which some scholars attribute to this disparity.

The discussion of the ideal size for the republic was not limited to the options of individual states or encompassing union.

In a letter to Richard Price , Benjamin Rush noted that "Some of our enlightened men who begin to despair of a more complete union of the States in Congress have secretly proposed an Eastern, Middle, and Southern Confederacy, to be united by an alliance offensive and defensive". In making their arguments, the Anti-Federalists appealed to both historical and theoretic evidence.

On the theoretical side, they leaned heavily on the work of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The Anti-Federalists Brutus and Cato both quoted Montesquieu on the issue of the ideal size of a republic, citing his statement in The Spirit of the Laws that:.

It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.

In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected. Greece and Rome were looked to as model republics throughout this debate, [31] and authors on both sides took Roman pseudonyms.

Brutus points out that the Greek and Roman states were small, whereas the U. He also points out that the expansion of these republics resulted in a transition from free government to tyranny. In the first century of the American republic, No. For instance, in Democracy in America , Alexis de Tocqueville refers specifically to more than fifty of the essays, but No.

News and World Report , No. The historian Charles A. Beard identified Federalist No. In his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States , Beard argued that Madison produced a detailed explanation of the economic factors that lay behind the creation of the Constitution.

At the outset of his study, Beard makes his point when he writes that Madison provided "a masterly statement of the theory of economic determinism in politics" Beard , p. Later in his study, Beard repeated his point, only providing more emphasis. Douglass Adair attributes the increased interest in the tenth number to Charles A.

Beard 's book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution , published in Adair also contends that Beard's selective focus on the issue of class struggle , and his political progressivism , has colored modern scholarship on the essay.

According to Adair, Beard reads No. Garry Wills is a noted critic of Madison's argument in Federalist No. In his book Explaining America , he adopts the position of Robert Dahl in arguing that Madison's framework does not necessarily enhance the protections of minorities or ensure the common good. But these weapons for delay are given to the minority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious character; and they can be used against the majority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious character.

What Madison prevents is not faction, but action. What he protects is not the common good but delay as such". For instance, United States Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens cites the paper for the statement, "Parties ranked high on the list of evils that the Constitution was designed to check".

See The Federalist, No. Madison's argument that restraining liberty to limit faction is an unacceptable solution has been used by opponents of campaign finance limits.

Justice Clarence Thomas , for example, invoked Federalist No. Rather than adopting the repressive 'cure' for faction that the majority today endorses, the Framers armed individual citizens with a remedy". From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Accessed January 22, See also "The Federalist Papers: Volume 1, Chapter 4, Document University of Chicago Press. Retrieved January 22, Referenced November 20, Volume 1, Chapter 17, Document Volume 1, Chapter 7, Document 7.

The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world".

Jones , U. Brown , U. Fame and the Founding Fathers. The Federalist with Letters of "Brutus". The MacMillan Company, Are We to Be a Nation? Harvard University Press, University Press of Kansas, De Pauw, Linda Grant.

Federalist Essays No.10 - No.17

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Federalist Essays No - No Summary The practical advantages of the union held together by the U.S. Constitution include a reduction of factions, proactive promotion of trade and wealth, and a more cost-effective government.

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The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

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A summary of Federalist Essays No - No in The Founding Fathers's The Federalist Papers (). Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of The Federalist Papers () and what it means. Summary & Analysis of Federalist #10 Summary: Madison begins perhaps the most famous of the Federalist papers by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions.

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Get free homework help on The Federalist: book summary, chapter summary and analysis and original text, quotes, essays, and character analysis courtesy of CliffsNotes. First published in , The Federalist is a collection of 85 newspaper articles, written by the mysterious Publius, that argued swift ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Summary of Federalist Paper 10 of The Federalist Papers 10 and Get a line-by-line breakdown of this section of the text to be sure you're picking up what The Federalist Papers 10 and 51 is putting down.